Firm ownership, quality of government and innovation: Evidence from patenting in the telecommunication industry by Clo, S. et al.
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Research Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/respol
Firm ownership, quality of government and innovation: Evidence from
patenting in the telecommunication industry
Stefano Clòa, Massimo Floriob, Francesco Rentocchinib,⁎
aUniversity of Florence, Italy
bDepartment of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods, University of Milan, Italy
A B S T R A C T
Despite the wave of privatisation in recent decades, enterprises under government control still account for a large part of assets and employment in several countries
and particularly continue to play a key role in certain network industries. We explore the potential role of State-Invested Enterprises (SIEs) as investors in innovation,
with particular interest in that played by the institutional environment. We focus on the telecommunication industry, which has been affected by fundamental
technological and organisational change, including liberalisation and privatisation, over the last decades but where public ownership still retains a major role. We
draw on a longitudinal data set of 706 telecom companies from 91 countries over the 2007–2015 period and show that public ownership is positively correlated to
patenting activity. We also find that - for both state-invested and private companies - improvements in institutional quality are positively associated with firm-level
patenting, and that such a relation is stronger under public ownership. We offer an interpretation of these findings which shed new light on the role of SIEs as patient
investors.
1. Introduction
The role of innovation in modern growth theory has been firmly
established since the contribution by Arrow (1962) who identified
learning and R&D as an endogenous driver of change. Subsequent de-
velopments of this theory (e.g. Romer, 1986, 1990; Aghion and
Howett, 1992; Nelson, 2005) established a potential role for govern-
ment support for R&D when firms are unable to attain the optimal
quantity of investment in knowledge creation. R&D by firms is con-
strained by two market failures: the uncertainty of returns to R&D
(Foray, 2004) and externalities due to knowledge spillovers
(Griliches, 1979, Grossman and Helpman, 1991). A traditional view to
counteract any externality consists in government intervention in dif-
ferent forms. Examples of government interventions to support R&D
include subsidies to private firms (Busom, 2000; Salter and
Martin, 2001; Trajtenberg, 2002), collaboration between public uni-
versities and firms (Bergman, 1990; Mansfield, 1991, 1998;
Veugelers and Cassiman, 2005; Segarra-Blasco and Arauzo-
Carod, 2008), public procurement for innovation by Big Science
(Castelnovo et al., 2018; Florio et al., 2018), and combined demand and
supply-side policies (Wonglimpiyarat, 2006; Guerzoni and Raiteri,
2015). More recently Mazzucato (2013, 2016) has promoted the view
that the government's role goes beyond the correction of market failures
as it supports technological breakthrough, which in turn creates en-
tirely new markets. Mazzucato (2017, 2018) advocates a governmental
mission-oriented innovation policy to address big societal challenges.
In this paper, we explore another mechanism of government support
for innovation: the potential role of enterprises under public control as
active players in technological creation. We focus on the tele-
communication industry, which has been affected by fundamental
technological and organisational change, including liberalisation and
privatisation, over the last decades but where the public ownership of
major players is still important.
Existing evidence on the relation between firms’ ownership and
innovation outcome at firm level is far from being conclusive
(Sterlacchini, 2012; Belloc, 2014; Fang et al., 2016; Rong et al., 2017;
Demircioglu and Audretsch, 2017). A strand of literature points to the
inferior innovation capability of enterprises under public control due to
their internal governance structure, lack of adequate monitoring and
market incentives and risk of political capture. On the other side, one
may argue that public enterprises might have a better attitude towards
innovation. In fact, both ownership concentration and stability, and the
departure from short-term goals may reduce the risk-aversion asso-
ciated with an activity which exchanges current and certain returns for
future and uncertain ones.
The relevance of this issue is motivated by evidence that, despite the
wave of privatisation that affected the world economy in recent dec-
ades, enterprises under government control still account for a large part
of assets and employment in both developed and developing econo-
mies, and continue to play a central role in network industries (e.g.
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telecommunication, oil & gas, railway, power generation).1 Moreover,
although there is consistent evidence on public ownership under-per-
formance compared to private companies in terms of efficiency, pro-
ductivity and profitability (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny, 1994,
Megginson and Netter, 2001, Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001), major
market-oriented reforms have increasingly exposed them to a new set of
incentives. Markets have been widely liberalised and former public
monopolists have been brought to compete against private enterprises
(Khandelwal et al., 2013; Koske et al., 2015). Traditional State-owned
enterprises have undergone major governance reforms as well. Their
proprietary structure has faced radical changes: many governments
have partially divested from them and, while continuing to maintain
the residual right to appoint the relative majority of the board, have
opened their shareholding structure to private equity (Bortolotti and
Faccio, 2009). In light of these transformations, enterprises under
public control are increasingly referred to as State-invested enterprises
(SIEs) (Christiansen and Kim, 2014).2 Various SIEs have been listed on a
stock exchange where they currently compete with private enterprises
in the collection of financial resources (Pargendler et al., 2013). The
consequence of these reforms has been a deep transformation in their
internal governance and management organisation, resulting in an
improvement in their financial accountability and economic perfor-
mance (Musacchio and Lazzarini, 2018). Thus, the question of whether
contemporary SIEs differ from their private competitors in terms of
their technological capabilities arises. This is our first research ques-
tion.
This paper further contributes to the existing literature by in-
vestigating the issue of ownership and innovation through the lens of
institutional economic theory (Williamson, 1985; North, 1990). Our
second research question is whether SIEs’ innovation-oriented attitude,
compared to private companies, is likely to be differentially affected by
the quality of government and of institutions in general. Indeed, gov-
ernments can appoint the SIEs’ managers, thus directing them on the
objectives to achieve, and are likely to influence SIEs’ internal gov-
ernance, monitoring and incentives mechanisms, and ultimately its
innovation capability. Consequently, we contend that the relationship
between firm-level innovation and ownership nature varies depending
on institutional quality. Our approach is motivated by the recognition
that the efficiency of the firm – and its ability to innovate – crucially
depends on institutional quality (Sala-i-Martin, 2002; Tebaldi and
Elmslie, 2013). We argue that this relation is stronger under public
ownership because, in this case, institutions affect both the quality of
the external environment where firms perform their economic activity
and the quality of SIEs’ internal governance and management me-
chanisms.
In the present paper, we address these issues by analysing a com-
prehensive dataset comprising information on companies operating all
around the globe in the telecommunication industry. To the best of our
knowledge, no studies have focused on the relation between ownership
and innovation for: (i) a sector (i.e. telecommunication) involving firms
that have undergone major transformations in their ownership nature
and competitive environment; (ii) companies operating in widely dif-
ferent geographical areas, thus entailing a large variance in the quality
of the institutions of the home country.
We considered patents as an empirical proxy of innovation by firms
and we modelled the interaction between ownership and institutional
quality as our variables of interest after controlling for firm-level, time
and geographical characteristics. Our investigation relied on three data
sources: information from the ORBIS dataset on economic character-
istics and ownership structure at the firm-level; detailed patent-level
information from PATSTAT; World Bank's Worldwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) database for data on countries’ institutional quality.
Our final sample comprises 706 telecom companies from 91 countries
over the 2007–15 period, for a total of 4854 firm-year observations.
Our main finding is that, firstly, government ownership per se po-
sitively correlates to patenting activity. Secondly, while improvements
in institutional quality are positively associated with firm-level pa-
tenting in general, such a relation is stronger under public ownership.
In fact, in countries with high-quality government and institutions, SIEs
show better patenting performance than private firms, while the reverse
occurs in countries with a low-institutional profile. We interpret this
main result in the following way: SIEs are more effective in terms of
patenting output when they benefit from improved internal governance
mechanisms and when they depart from the short-term profit goal of
private enterprises. This is true, however, only in countries with high-
level institutions. When corruption is at a minimum level, accountable
governments are likely to adopt transparent selection procedures and
effective monitoring mechanisms and commit the SIE's management on
long-term goals. This view can be consistent with two main arguments.
The first relates to short-termism argument and the risky nature of the
R&D activity which implies uncertain and time-deferred returns
(Porter, 1992; Stein, 1988). When facing pressure for immediate re-
sults, managers of private (privatised) firms are more likely to have a
risk-averse attitude and to redirect financial resources from risky pa-
tenting activities to more conventional and short-term oriented activ-
ities. The second argument relates to the possibility of the patenting
activity to generate potential spillovers and positive externalities (such
as those related to connectivity and the digital agenda) that are more
likely to be internalised by SIEs rather than by private firms. Con-
versely, in countries with corruption problems, the SIEs’ controlling
governments are likely to give priority to the short-term private inter-
ests of politicians and other stakeholders and do not implement sound
management strategies, thus causing resources misallocation and
bringing the SIEs to underperform compared to private peers in terms of
technological development.3
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review
of the core contributions addressing the relationship between public
versus private ownership structure and firm performance, with a focus
on innovation activity. The section concludes by formulating a set of
research questions pertaining to the effect of ownership structure, type
of control and institutional quality on innovation activity at the firm
level. Section 3 presents the dataset and describes the sample, variables
and method that were employed for the present empirical analysis.
Section 4 presents the results of the econometric analysis and robust-
ness checks. Section 5 summarises the main findings and discusses the
most relevant implications of our study.
2. Literature review and research questions
Ownership of the firm is increasingly recognised as a factor that
affects its capacity to develop technological innovation (Choi et al.,
2011, 2012; Lazzarini et al., 2016). Indeed, the firm's internal
1 For a review see PWC (2015), Christiansen and Kim (2014), European
Commission (2016). According to the OECD, in the telecom sector, the major
market player is still controlled by the government (by means of a majority or
minority of shares) in the following countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Turkey, China, India, South Africa, Cyprus, Latvia and Romania
(Koske et al., 2015).
2 In this paper, we prefer to adopt the term “state-invested enterprises” to take
into account the important changes these firms have undergone in recent years
(i.e. government divestment, entrance of private equity, etc.). We use the tra-
ditional term “state-owned enterprise” only when we use arguments that ex-
plicitly refer to a period of time before these major changes took place.
3 Following the suggestion by a reviewer, we acknowledge that strategic
patenting behaviour (e.g. the creation of patent thickets) can be aimed at
fending off competition. In this case, more patents would have the opposite
effect than serving valuable social goals. This is an issue that goes beyond the
scope of our work but that deserves attention from future research.
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organisation, governance mechanisms, and the goals that managers are
instructed to achieve crucially depend on the nature of the owner re-
taining residual rights of control over the firm. Building on the career
concern hypothesis formulated by Holmstrom (1999),
Aghion et al. (2013) find that, among listed companies, those in which
institutional owners participate (hedge and mutual funds) are asso-
ciated with more innovation. The authors argue that managers may be
reluctant to undertake R&D investments with an intrinsic probability of
failure, especially when the principal does not develop the monitoring
mechanisms that are required to understand whether a potential failure
of the project is due to the manager's incompetence or other reasons. To
contrast this risk, by implementing effective monitoring and incentive
mechanisms, institutional owners lower information asymmetries and
reduce managers’ career risk in association with projects with uncertain
returns. This encourages an increase in managers’ attitude towards in-
novative projects.
Other studies have investigated this issue, finding different and
potentially conflicting channels through which the ownership nature of
the firm affects its capacity to innovate (Belloc, 2014). An established
stream of literature points to the lower efficiency of traditional public
ownership compared to private companies (Vining and Boardman,
1992; Shleifer, 1998). Following this line of argument, the main source
of their inefficiency is traced back to the government's inability to (i)
effectively monitor managers’ behaviour and to (ii) design an adequate
set of incentives aimed at reducing principal-agent problems by
aligning owners’ and managers’ objectives (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991; Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Other reasons behind public
ownership inferior efficiency refer to the lack of hard budget constraints
and the absence of a takeover threat (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; La
Porta et al., 1998), as low replacement risk fails to give public managers
the adequate incentives to run the firm efficiently and improve its
performance. A final important source of inefficiency is the risk of po-
litical interference and capture by private interests (Shleifer and
Vishny, 1994; Mauro, 1995). Bad governments may use their controlled
enterprises as a vehicle to pursue private goals at the expenses of social
well-being, causing the misallocation of resources. By hindering effi-
ciency and productivity, these constraints are likely to negatively affect
the traditional state-owned enterprises’ dynamic efficiency and cap-
ability to develop successful innovations. This argument is confirmed
by recent evidence from China on the inferior innovative performance
of state-owned enterprises compared to private firms (Hu and Jefferson,
2009; Boeing et al., 2016; Fang et al., 2016). Notably,
Rong et al. (2017) find that the positive impact of institutional own-
ership on innovation (Aghion et al., 2013) is not significant when in-
stitutional owners hold a minority of stakes in firms that are controlled
by the State where managers are likely to be appointed according to
their political connections rather than their business competences.
Contrary to this dominant view, there is evidence suggesting that
enterprises under public control can actually perform similarly to pri-
vate enterprises (Szarzec and Nowara, 2017) or even better in some
sectors and countries (Borghi et al., 2016; Florio, 2013); in some cir-
cumstances they exhibit certain internal features that may provide a
comparative innovation advantage with respect to private companies. A
first argument relates to the risk of short-termism that may affect profit-
maximizing private enterprises. It has been argued that pressure for
immediate results induces managers to redirect financial resources from
R&D activities to more conventional and short-term oriented activities
(Porter, 1992; Stein, 1988). Evidence of short-termism has been found
when looking at private enterprises listed on the stock market
(Ferreira et al., 2013), especially when they are participated by spec-
ulating investors (Bushee 1998, 2001), and when enterprises are ac-
quired through excessive means of financial leverage. On top of this
argument, the traditional public economics literature stresses the dif-
ference in the objective functions between private and public en-
terprises that allow the latter to adopt strategies and investments with
long-term returns that private investors looking for high and fast
returns are not willing to undertake. When activities entail positive
externalities that cannot be fully monetised, private enterprises might
be reluctant to undertake optimal investments, while this market failure
is less likely to occur under public owership (Atkinson and Stiglitz,
1980; Kaldor, 1980).
Another relevant issue for the firm's capacity to innovate is its in-
ternal stability. Ownership concentration is found to be positively as-
sociated with R&D expenditures and innovation (Francis and Smith,
1995). The propensity and capacity to develop long-term R&D projects
is likely to benefit from a stable environment. Conversely, managers
under a continuous threat of replacement may increase their preference
of conventional projects with a lower probability of failure (Stein, 1988;
Kaplan et al., 2012; Sapra et al., 2013).
The departure from short-term profits, features of internal long-term
stability and ownership concentration are likely to characterise firms
under government control and may put public managers in a better
position to deal with long-term innovative projects characterised by
uncertain and time-deferred returns. These arguments are supported by
the empirical evidence that privatisation has been associated with a
decline in R&D activity (Munari and Oriani, 2005; Sterlacchini, 2012;
Xie, 2012), and that privatisation through leveraged buyout has re-
duced R&D intensity and investments in innovation (Zahra and
Fescina, 1991; Long and Ravenscraft's, 1993).
Other insights on this issue have been derived by the theoretical
literature on mixed oligopoly, which represents the market structure for
the majority of telecommunication companies in many countries and in
a global perspective. State-owned enterprises, state-invested or partially
privatised corporations, and private companies, are all (potentially)
strategically interacting among them, often to secure larger market
shares. Earlier theoretical literature on mixed oligopolies has tried to
model the innovation and R&D implications of such setting with an
early example being Delbono and Denicolò (1993) (for more recent
contributions see Gil-Moltò et al., 2011,2019). The authors focus on the
optimal R&D subsidies in a mixed duopoly market and show that pri-
vatisation of a state-owned enterprise reduces R&D activity and social
welfare in the duopoly market, even when R&D subsidies are provided.
Overall the mixed oligopoly strand of literature supports the view that
R&D expenditures are higher in SIEs because of differences in their
objectives in comparison to profit maximising private firms.4
Following the discussion above, earlier literature has found con-
trasting results, thus preventing the development of any unambiguous
prediction on the impact of ownership on innovation. We believe that
these apparently conflicting views are due to an important omission in
the analysis and can be reconciled within a broader general conceptual
framework once the role of institutions is properly taken into con-
sideration. Notably, we argue that institutions are linked to the own-
ership of the firm by a double relation. One is external to the firm itself
and affects both private and public enterprises, the other is internal to
the firm and mainly involves enterprises under governmental control.
Institutions govern economic and social interactions within a
country and can be defined as the broad set of formal and informal rules
shaping the environment where citizens interact in society and where
firms carry out their economic activity (North, 1990). It is widely re-
cognised that the quality of institutions affects firms’ strategies, per-
formance and, ultimately, economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Rajan and
Zingales, 1998; Acemoglu et al., 2001; Helpman, 2004; Rigobon and
Rodrik, 2004). The certainty of the rule of law5; the strengths and
4 Extending these models in a game theoretic setting with multiple players,
different ownership and regulatory regime is beyond the scope of the current
work. Nevertheless, we see as an interesting future avenue of research given the
features of the contemporary global telecommunication industry.
5 The rule of law has been defined as a principle of governance in which “all
persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself,
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and
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effectiveness of law enforcement, judicial and correctional procedures;
the degree of government effectiveness, transparency and account-
ability; the absence of corruption: all these elements contribute to de-
termining the quality of institutions within a country. They constrain
the firms’ endowment of resources, affect their production costs and
consequently shape their strategies and decision-making processes.
Previous research shows that the linkage between institutional quality
and firms’ performance (Baumol, 1990; Dollar et al., 2005;
Commander and Svejnar, 2011) positively affects the process of
knowledge accumulation (Sala-i-Martin, 2002; Gradstein, 2004;
Rodriguez-Pose and Di Cataldo, 2015). Boschma and Capone (2015)
find that institutions affect the direction of the diversification process
and their industrial evolution. Tebaldi and Elmslie (2008, 2013) pro-
vide empirical evidence that the absence of corruption, the protection
of property rights and the effectiveness of judiciary systems impact on
the economy's rate of innovation and are significant in explaining cross-
country patenting variations.
Building on this extensive literature, we firstly argue that the po-
sitive relation between institutions and firm dynamic efficiency is ex-
ternal to the firm itself and does not depend on their ownership nature.
Both public and private firms benefit from a safe environment and their
propensity towards innovative but risky investments increases with
their confidence in the quality of the underlying institutional frame-
work. However, we also argue that there is a second channel linking
institutions and enterprises. As opposed to the previous one, this rela-
tion is internal to the firm and is more relevant for SIEs than for private
enterprises. The quality of the government (e.g. transparency, ac-
countability, absence of corruption) is likely to affect public manage-
ment appointment procedures, SIEs’ internal governance and mon-
itoring mechanisms, and the objectives that SIEs are instructed to
achieve.
The phenomena of political capture, orientation towards immediate
personal objectives, and misallocation of resources are more likely to
take place in countries characterised by low quality institutions.
Enterprises under the control of a malevolent government are brought
to bargain short-term private returns at the expense of long-term social
goals. Thus, we expected that a bad institutional quality is detrimental
to SIEs’ innovation performance compared to private enterprises.
Conversely, SIEs that are located in countries with high quality in-
stitutions are more likely to rely on internal stability, transparent
monitoring and selection procedures and clear commitment towards
long term socially valuable goals. Therefore, we expected high in-
stitutional quality to have an incremental positive effect on SIEs’ ca-
pacity to innovate compared to private enterprises.
In light of these considerations, our empirical analysis explicitly
considered both external and internal dimensions linking institutions to
enterprises in order to understand firms’ drivers of innovation. Notably,
based on the conceptual framework outlined above, we predicted the
following relations to hold. First, according to the recognition of the
positive effect that good institutions exert on economic growth and
industrial evolution, we anticipated a positive relation between in-
stitutional quality and innovation at the firm level. Second, given the
direct positive effect of institutional quality on SIE's internal govern-
ance and management, we expected that, as institutional quality im-
proves, innovation will increase at the margin more in SIEs than in
private enterprises. These arguments bring us to expect SIEs to be in-
ferior enterprises in their innovation performance compared to private
enterprises under a poor institutional framework. When the quality of
institutions is high, SIEs are expected to outperform private enterprises
in their capacity to innovate.
3. The telecommunication industry
We focus on the global telecom industry.6 There are several reasons
why this represents an interesting setting to address our research
questions. First, this is fast evolving industry where innovation re-
presents a key-determinant for enterprises to grow, expand their busi-
ness and increase profits (Davies, 1996; Godoe, 2000; Lam and
Shiu, 2010).7 Second, in past decades the telecom industry has under-
gone an important pattern of reforms. Traditional state-owned en-
terprises that used to operate under a legal monopoly have been widely
brought to compete in liberalised markets and underwent a process of
privatisation, with different degrees of intensity across different coun-
tries (Clifton et al., 2011; Florio 2013). This ensures a high level of
heterogeneity in corporate ownership among telecom enterprises.
Third, the global perspective we adopt allows us to exploit the high
institutional heterogeneity characterising the countries where telecom
firms operate. The fact that telecom SIEs are located both in countries
characterised by high-quality of institutional arrangements (e.g.
Swisscom in Switzerland, Deutsche Telekom in Germany, Alcatel and
Orange in France) and in countries with a lower institutional setting
(e.g. Telecom Egypt in Egypt, Rostelecom in Russia, China Telecom in
China) allows to integrate the institutional perspective into the analysis
of ownership as a determinant of innovation.
To put the discussion in the context of innovation in the tele-
communications industry, we briefly remind some of the drivers of
change in the sector. The model prevailing in the 1980s (at a time
where fixed telephony was the main technology) was such that the
major telecommunication operators (PTO, Public Telecommunication
Operators) were highly vertically integrated state-owned companies.
They were often supplying the service, owning the network, operating
it, and directly producing a part of the equipment. Under the ar-
rangement before the 1990s, R&D units where typically integrated
within the major telecom companies and most of the technological
innovations were the result of in-house research on areas as different as
switching devices, routers, cables technology, digitalization of the
signal, integration with the newly born mobile telephony, and so on.
The industry was then affected by a series of disruptive technology
shocks, notably between 1985 and 2005. As recalled by Davies (1996),
the telecommunication industry was transformed by a cluster of radical
innovations pushed from the cost-saving opportunities stemming not
only from potential economies of scale and scope, but most of all from
the introduction of large technical systems of control composed by
high-capacity telephone exchanges, computer databases and signalling
systems. Davies recognizes that the main innovation of the tele-
communication system involved the introduction of software-based
control devices into large scale components, which induced substantial
industrial and corporate transformation. Accordingly,
Nightingale et al. (2003) acknowledge the importance of control sys-
tems to coordinate the traffic and flow of information in complex net-
works and add that substantial innovation in various sectors derived at
(footnote continued)
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human
rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence
to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, fairness in the
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making,
legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transpar-
ency” (United Nations Secretary-General, 2004, par. 6)
6 A firm is considered to operate in the telecom industry when, according to
the NACE rev. 2 classification, it belongs to sector 61 “Telecommunications”,
which includes wired (61.10), wireless (61.20), satellite (61.30) and other
(61.90) telecommunication activities.
7 The introduction of breakthrough technologies has brought to an increasing
consumption pattern and, more in general, to radical changes in our daily life
and to how people interact in society. Some of the most relevant technological
changes in the telecom industry are the Global System for Mobile commu-
nications; the World Wide Web; triple-play “telephony, television, and internet
access” offer as well as the high-speed wireless communication for mobile
phones and data terminals.
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the end of the last century from the incorporation of software and
microprocessors into control technologies. Notably, the emergence of
the internet and, later on, the full integration of internet with smart-
phones forced telecom providers to shift from circuit switching with
dedicated connections between users to packet switching, where in-
formation is broken down and reassembled at destination. At the same
time the traffic skyrocketed, and the physical networks had to be re-
designed, particularly to accommodate billions of new users of mobile
devices. For telecom networks the main drivers of evolution in the new
highly integrated ICT panorama were reducing latency of the signal,
bandwidth and quality of the signal. This had implications for the in-
terconnection of international telephone gateways, internet exchange
points, national and local systems, with a complex pattern of innovation
in cloud computing, fixed networks (i.e. optical fibre) and wireless
access network, fixed wireless access, radio links and telecom satellites.
Evidently, all of these changes implied an important restructuring of the
value network and the role of R&D. Notably, several companies in the
telecommunication sector became much less vertically integrated with
innovation mainly embodied in the equipment they purchase
(Fransman, 1994). Thus, they have changed from organizations that
pursue innovation and associated patenting activities in-house to or-
ganizations that apply technology from complementary industries.
4. Data and variables
We combined data from three different sources. The first source is
the ORBIS database managed by the Bureau Van Dijk, which contains
yearly information on the financial, accounting and corporate char-
acteristics of a large number of international companies. From this data
source, we retrieved information related to investments in tangible
assets, investments in intangible assets and market shares, firm geo-
graphical location, operating revenues, year of incorporation, and
whether the firm is listed on a stock market. ORBIS also contains re-
levant information relating to the patenting activity of companies.
Bureau Van Dijk has extended the OECD HAN database (Harmonised
Applicants’ Names) (Thoma et al., 2010) and provides a reliable
matching of patent assignee names (and the corresponding publication
numbers) with ORBIS firms. Therefore, our second source of data refers
to firm patenting activity. Following previous studies in the analysis of
innovation in the telecommunication sector exploiting patent data (see,
among the others, Calderini and Scellato, 2005; Nambisan, 2013;
Bekkers et al., 2002), we relied on the Worldwide Patent Statistical
Database (PATSTAT) to retrieve information on the names of the as-
signees, publication number, filing dates and number of citations. Fi-
nally, we relied on the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators
(WGI) database for data on countries’ institutional quality. We com-
bined the information collected from the three data sources described
above, and we restricted our sample to telecommunication companies
(Sectors 61.10, 61.20, 61.30 and 61.90 of NACE Rev. 2) with complete
information on their variables of interest over the 2007–15 period, thus
attaining an unbalanced panel comprising 706 firms from 91 countries
(4854 firm-year observations).
As discussed in the preceding sections, we are interested in ex-
plaining the innovative activity of firms in the telecommunication
sector. Our key outcome variable is the total number of patent appli-
cations filed every year by each company in our sample.8 While being
an imperfect proxy of innovation activity at the firm level,9 patents are
publicly available documents that are collected on a regular basis and
measure the direct outcome of the innovation process while allowing
for international comparison (Griliches, 1990). Not only, patent data is
characterised by the presence of very long historical time series, which
show only minor disturbances by occasional changes of patent laws
(Kleinknecht et al., 2002). Furthermore, patent counts show a high
correlation with other measures of innovative performance at the firm
level, such as R&D spending and new product announcements
(Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003). We also tested the robustness of our
results by controlling for the quality of the patents that are filed at the
firm level. To this end, we used the number of granted and quality-
weighted (using 3-years and 5-years citations’ timeframes) patents.
Although patent-based indicators have been used to proxy for in-
novation activity by companies by a large body of the literature in the
economics and management of innovation in the past decades, we
would like to draw the reader's attention on a number of additional
caveats when employing them in the analysis of the innovation activity
in the telecommunication sector.10 Notably, given the structural shifts
in the value network of the telecommunication industry highlighted in
Section 3 above, using patents as proxy for innovation activity by tel-
ecom companies may simply shed light on the changing location of
R&D (from the telecommunication industry to complementary in-
dustries such as manufacturers of communication equipment) and it
may be less useful as a proxy for innovation for existing telecom firms.
A telecommunication network operator may be highly innovative, de-
ploying the latest technology in its networks and enabling the most
advanced services, all based on appropriate procurement policies
without relying on R&D directly. This problem is further exacerbated by
a traditional drawback of patent data: they are reliable proxy of in-
novation activity in manufacturing industries but less so in the service
sector (Kleinknecht et al., 2002; Hipp and Grupp, 2005). In spite of the
above drawbacks, we believe that patent count is still a useful measure
to proxy for firm innovation performance in the telecommunication
industry. The appendix provides a thorough discussion of why this is
the case.
Our first explanatory variable refers to whether the firm is state
owned or not. A firm is considered a SIE when it is ultimately owned by
a government or public authority, where the ultimate owner is defined
as the individual or entity at the top of the corporate ownership
structure who exercises ultimate effective control over the company
(the ultimate controlling shareholder which holds at least 25.01% of
total (i.e. direct and indirect) ownership). Ownership is thus defined by
identifying the owner of the largest share of equity in the company or
along the chain of ownership in the controlling firm(s).11 This criterion
encompasses both enterprises under direct public control, where the
government is the top shareholder,12 and under indirect public control,
where the government is the ultimate owner through a chain of up-
stream ownership relations while it does not figure as the SIE's top
shareholder.13
8 We restrict our analysis to patents filed in the main patent offices (USPTO,
EPO and JPO). On top of ensuring higher quality, stringency and transparency
in the evaluation procedure, they grant wider geographical IP protection in the
most relevant markets.
9 Several innovations are not patented and some technologies are not pa-
tentable (e.g. mathematical models, computer programs, aesthetic creations).
Furthermore, patent measures can be biased by a firm strategic behaviour that,
(footnote continued)
for example, decides not to commercialise a patented invention but only to hold
the patent to prevent a competitor to use the technology (Archibugi and
Pianta, 1996).
10 We would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for pointing this
out.
11 The ownership of a company is determined by adopting the following
procedure. For each year of the 2007–15 period, we extracted information on
the firm's top shareholder from ORBIS. The former refers to the owner of the
largest share of equity in the company, so we proceeded in a recursive manner
until the ultimate controller is identified, especially when such an entity is a
governmental body.
12 This includes, for instance Swisscom (CH), Orange (FR), China Mobile (CN)
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (JP), Temasek (SG), Teliasonera (SE),
MobiFone (VT).
13 e.g. Fastweb (IT) is controlled by Swisscom, a private shareholder which, in
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During the 2007–15 period under analysis, the ownership nature of
the firm was very stable (less than 3% of companies shifted from public
to private property, or vice versa), thus lowering the risk of our results
being biased by a potential problem of reverse causality (e.g. the pos-
sibility that the performance of the firm affects its probability of being
privatised or nationalised).
Around 72% of the sample (3485 firm-year observations) comprises
private companies (e.g. Vodafone and British Telecom (UK), Telecom
Italia (IT), America Movil (MX)). The remaining 28% of the sample
(1372 firm-year observations) is composed of firms controlled by a
government.
The second explanatory set of variables refers to the quality of the
government in the country where each firm is located. To measure in-
stitutional quality, we followed a consolidated literature and used the
World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann and
Kraay, 2008; Kaufmann et al., 2011). In light of our specific interest in
the quality of the government controlling the SIEs, we decided to focus
our attention on the Control of Corruption (CC) indicator, which cap-
tures “the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture"
of the state by elites and private interests” (pag 223, Kaufmann et al.,
2011). Nevertheless, the CC indicator is highly correlated with the
other WGI indicators, thus pointing to a high degree of overlapping of
these measures (the correlation coefficients range between 0.7 and 0.9).
Moreover, our main results are broadly confirmed when we consider
other WGI indicators, such as government effectiveness (GE); rule of
law (RL) and regulatory quality (RQ), or voice and accountability
(VA).14
We also included a set of variables recognised as relevant to explain
patenting activity at the firm level: investment in tangible and in-
tangible (fixed) assets, the firm's total assets, operating revenues, the
firm's age, industry concentration and whether the company is listed on
a stock market. Investments in firms’ assets have been found to be an
important factor when explaining their innovative activity
(Thornhill, 2006). Although investment in intangible assets is an im-
perfect measure of R&D investment at the firm level, it has been used as
a proxy of R&D investment when data on R&D expenses is not available
or affected by self-selection bias as in our case (Leoncini et al., 2019;
Marin, 2014). Investment in tangible (intangible) assets come from
companies’ financial statements and have been deflated by using the
country-level consumer price index provided by the World Bank (with
2010 as base year). Building upon the extensive literature investigating
the determinants of a firm's innovative activity, we control for firm size
(measured as the yearly amount of total assets), profitability (operating
revenues), age, and firm-level transparency constraints and financial
accountability (stock market listing). We also include a popular mea-
sure of industry concentration, as the latter has been found to play a
relevant role with respect to firms’ patenting performance
(Aghion et al., 2005; Breschi et al., 2000). A four-firm concentration
ratio was computed as the market share of the four largest firms in
terms of operating revenues at 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 industry codes each
year.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the patenting performance,
institutional quality and other relevant firm characteristics for SIEs and
non-SIEs, while Figs. 1 and 2 show the geographical distribution of,
respectively, firms and patent applications per ownership type.15 These
descriptive statistics show that SIEs tend, on average, to apply for a
higher number of patents compared to private companies. The differ-
ence between private and public companies in the number of patent
applications is likely to depend on the degree of heterogeneity within
the private firms’ group. This group includes small companies that have
been historically found to have a low propensity to patent the results of
innovation activity (Andries and Faems, 2013). When we removed the
companies that had not applied for any patent from the descriptive
statistics, we found that the average values increase, but the difference
between SIEs and private enterprises (POEs) persist. In our sample,
private enterprises are, on average, larger in size (in terms of both total
assets and operating revenues) and show higher investment in tangible
and intangible assets compared to SIEs. The high value of standard
deviation shows that this pattern might be driven by some relevant
outliers among private companies (notably US telecom enterprises, e.g.
AT&T, Verizon, Centurylink). If we focus on median values, SIEs invest
more in tangible assets compared to POEs but have lower operating
revenues. Concentration ratio values show that telecom companies
mainly compete in oligopolistic markets and that, on average, SIEs
operate in more concentrated markets than private companies.
It is interesting to observe that 48% of the private companies are
listed on a stock market, while this percentage increases up to 55% for
SIEs. This suggests that, despite being controlled by a public entity,
many SIEs have improved their financial accountability and are in-
creasingly exposed to market incentives through stock market listing.
Table 1 also shows that, compared to private companies, SIEs are re-
latively more concentrated in countries characterised by lower in-
stitutional quality (mainly non-OECD countries). The higher standard
deviation in institutional quality measures for SIEs suggests that in-
stitutional quality is more heterogeneous under public ownership. SIEs
can be found both in countries belonging to the lower tail of institu-
tional quality distribution (Egypt, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Serbia, Rus-
sian Federation, Ukraine, Venezuela, Vietnam) as well as the upper tail
(Austria, Germany, Finland, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land).
5. Estimation strategy and results
We are interested in examining the effect of state ownership,
country institutional quality and their interplay on patenting activity at
the firm-level. Section 5.1 contains a discussion of our empirical
strategy, while Section 5.2 presents our main results on the relationship
between ownership type and firm patenting. In the same section we
analyse how this relation varies depending on the quality of institu-
tions.
(footnote continued)
turn, is controlled by the Swiss government; as regards Hellenic
Telecommunications (GR) the top shareholder is Deutsche Telekom, a private
shareholder which in turn is controlled by the German government.
14 There are undisputable advantages in the use of WGIs. First of all, they are
among the most widely used cross-country governance indicators currently
available, as they have been employed as proxies for institutional quality in a
wide number of peer-reviewed scientific articles. Moreover, they provide in-
formation about more than 200 countries for a long time period (1996-2018).
Another advantage is that these indicators are based on hundreds of underlying
individual indicators drawn from 30 different organizations, relying on re-
sponses from tens of thousands of citizens, enterprise managers, and experts.
Obviously, there are also drawbacks in the use of these indicators. For example,
Knack (2006) mentions that WGI are not suitable for cross-country and over-
time comparisons due to a combination of issues in scaling and the difficulty to
estimate governance using different data sources. Biased expert assessment is
another critical component that has been highlighted by mentioning that WGI
indicators are affected by overly emphasis on business regulations, ideological
biases as well as upwardly biased scores positively correlated to economic
performance (Kurtz and Shrank, 2007). Finally, some authors have suggested
that experts make similar errors when assessing the same country, thus leading
to within-country correlation in the perception errors (Williams and Siddique,
2006). Despite the issues highlighted above, WGIs are a widely diffused mea-
sure of institutional quality with a long historical series and excellent cross-
country coverage. Moreover, many of the concerns raised about WGIs are likely
to arise in the context of other existing and proposed efforts to measure in-
stitutional quality (Kaufmann et al., 2007).
15 As our sample comprises firms from more than 80 countries worldwide, for
the sake of clarity, data have been aggregated by macro geographical areas.
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5.1. Model specification
To study the relationship between firms’ ownership and its pa-
tenting activity, and given the count nature of the dependent variable
(number of patents) containing positive and integer values, we rely on a
Poisson specification to model the number of patents (y) a firm applies
for:





with = =E Y var Y µ[ ] [ ]
Adopting a Poisson regression model, we specify the conditional
mean in the following formula:
= + + + +E PAT exp SIE X Z Y[ ] ( )i t i t i t c t, , , (1)
where the dependent variable is the expected number of PATi,t, the
number of patents filed by firm i in year t. SIEi,t, takes the value of 1
when the firm is controlled by a government and zero otherwise. The
vector Xi,t includes the set of control variables described in Section 4
which have been log-transformed for estimation purposes. As for firm-
level controls, the size of the company is proxied by its operating rev-
enues. Tangible assets measure the firm's capital expenditures; in-
tangible assets are used as a proxy for internal R&D effort, since data on
R&D expenditures are missing for most of the firms composing our
sample. We also considered the age of the firm and whether the firm is
listed on a stock exchange. As for country level controls, we included
the concentration ratio CR4, which measures the market share of the
four largest firms in terms of operating revenues for each year and
country. Time and geographical fixed-effects were added to control for
potential confounding factors and for correlated unobserved hetero-
geneity. Year fixed-effects Yt capture time-dependent common shocks
including macroeconomic exogenous shocks (2007–15), while Zc are
country level fixed effects (85 countries).
Given the positive-skewed distribution with a long right tail, we first
adopted the Poisson model as the main estimation approach with
standard errors being robust to heteroskedasticity. Although our de-
pendent variable shows a departure from the assumption of equi-dis-
persion (i.e. the mean and variance of our dependent variable are sig-
nificantly different) characterising Poisson regression models, recent
work has consistently shown that the Poisson regression model has
several advantages compared to alternative regression models (e.g.
negative binomial). The Poisson regression model provides consistent
Table 1
Descriptive statistics by ownership type – period 2007–2015.
Median Mean SD Min Max
Operating revenues (th. $)
Private Enterprises 26,838 1690,759 9609,552 0 163,800,000
SIEs 21,315 696,792 2130,091 0 17,830,028
Total assets (th. $)
Private Enterprises 59,439 3415,506 20,700,000 0 402,700,000
SIEs 41,498 1480,163 4568,302 10 46,969,852
Intangible assets (th. $)
Private Enterprises 3243⁎⁎⁎ 1336,742 10,400,000 0 225,300,000
SIEs 2592⁎⁎⁎ 295,869 1154,485 0 98,45,798
Tangible assets (th. $)
Private Enterprises 9535 1198,763 7411,236 0 124,500,000
SIEs 12,763 518,957 1687,615 0 18,068,106
Listed
Private Enterprises 0.0⁎⁎⁎ 0.48 0.50 0 1
SIEs 1.0⁎⁎⁎ 0.55 0.50 0 1
Year of incorporation
Private Enterprises 1997 1990 24 1846 2014
SIEs 1995 1988 27 1852 2013
Patent applications
Private Enterprises 0.0⁎⁎⁎ 6.6 61.7 0.0 1571.0
SIEs 0.0⁎⁎⁎ 55.1 375.4 0.0 4035.0
Control of corruptiona
Private Enterprises 82⁎⁎⁎ 73 23 2 100
SIEs 62⁎⁎⁎ 63 26 1 100
Concentration ratioCR4
Private Enterprises 0.89⁎⁎⁎ 0.84 0.17 0.32 1.00
SIEs 0.94⁎⁎⁎ 0.88 0.15 0.32 1.00
a Institutional quality indicators refer to the country of the enterprise and are
reported in percentile rank terms, ranging from 0 (lowest rank) to 100 (highest
rank).
⁎⁎⁎ Difference significant at 1% level according to Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
Fig. 1. Number of firms by ownership type and macro geographical area. Source: own elaboration on Bureau Van Dijk.
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estimates of coefficients of interest even when the underlying dis-
tribution of the dependent variable is not Poisson but the conditional
mean is correctly specified (Gourieroux et al., 1984; Wooldridge,
1999).16 Moreover, the Poisson regression model is robust to a number
of misspecifications such as over-dispersion (it can be accommodated
by using robust standard errors), the presence of an excessive number of
zeros, and to dependence over time as well as cross-sectional depen-
dence (Bertanha and Moser, 2016).
Then, we extended the baseline model by adding institutional
quality measures and interacting them with the ownership variable
(Eq. (2)). This allowed us to assess whether the change in institutional
quality differentially affects the patenting activity of private companies
compared to SIEs.
= + + + + + +
PAT




i t i t i t i t i t c t
,
, , , , ,
(2)
5.2. Results and discussion
Table 2 contains the results from the models above. Column 1 re-
ports the baseline knowledge production function. Results show that
the number of patents is positively and significantly associated to the
size of the firm (measured by the log of operating revenues), the in-
tensity of R&D internal effort (proxied by the log of intangible assets)
and firm age. Being listed on a stock market is positively associated to
patenting activity. Listed companies manage to attract a larger amount
of private equity and become more financially accountable. Both phe-
nomena contribute to explaining this result. Market competition is also
found to be positively associated with firm-level patenting activity, as
an increase in the market concentration index is associated with a re-
duction in the number of patents. These results favour a picture of the
telecom industries with low market concentration, high firm size and
positive role of internal R&D for innovation which can be entirely as-
similated neither to a “Schumpeter Mark I” nor to a “Schumpeter Mark
II” pattern of innovation. This lack of a clear result in the pattern of
Fig. 2. Number of patents by ownership and macro geographical area – period 2007–15. Source: own elaboration on Bureau Van Dijk and Patstat.
Table 2
The role of institutional quality and public ownership in firm patenting activity.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tangible Assets −0.229⁎⁎⁎ −0.164⁎⁎⁎ −0.220⁎⁎⁎ −0.250⁎⁎⁎
(0.053) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Intangible Assets 0.150⁎⁎ 0.058 0.157⁎⁎⁎ 0.182⁎⁎⁎
(0.059) (0.039) (0.046) (0.043)
Operating Revenues 0.392⁎⁎⁎ 0.322⁎⁎⁎ 0.408⁎⁎⁎ 0.436⁎⁎⁎
(0.076) (0.074) (0.091) (0.085)
Age 1.126⁎⁎⁎ 0.840⁎⁎⁎ 0.841⁎⁎⁎ 0.821⁎⁎⁎
(0.159) (0.123) (0.123) (0.125)
Listed 1.791⁎⁎⁎ 1.836⁎⁎⁎ 1.769⁎⁎⁎ 1.917⁎⁎⁎
(0.265) (0.227) (0.223) (0.230)
Concentration Ratio −5.073⁎⁎⁎ −4.103⁎⁎⁎ −2.126⁎⁎ −1.444
(0.903) (0.647) (0.846) (0.902)
SIE 1.684⁎⁎⁎ 1.563⁎⁎⁎ −12.367⁎⁎⁎
(0.169) (0.152) (2.128)




Constant −2.988⁎⁎ −2.464⁎⁎⁎ −14.280⁎⁎⁎ −4.870⁎⁎
(1.257) (0.910) (2.703) (2.396)
Observations 4854 4854 4854 4854
Year and Country FEs YES YES YES YES
Pseudo Rsq 0.820 0.846 0.872 0.881
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎ p < 0.1; Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
16 The same does not hold for the Negative Binomial, i.e. when the dependent
variable is not gamma distributed, the coefficient of interest is not consistently
estimated even if the conditional mean is correctly specified.
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innovation of the telecommunication sector resonates well with results
from previous work (Malerba and Orsenigo 1994, 1996).
In Column 2 of Table 2 we test our research question relating to the
differential role of public ownership on firm-level patenting activity
and controlling for major potential confounding factors. Variable SIEi,t
has a positive and significant coefficient, suggesting that public own-
ership is associated with higher patenting activity compared to the
private benchmark.
Column 3 of Table 2 shows the results of our estimation when a
measure for the quality of government is added to the knowledge
production function. Results show that the “control of corruption” WGI
indicator has a positive and significant coefficient, supporting the ar-
gument that improvement in the quality of institutions is positively
associated with firm patenting performance. This result is confirmed in
the next version of the model, where the public ownership variable
interacts with the institutional quality variable (Columns 4). When fo-
cusing on the ownership dimension of the firm, two interesting results
emerge. First, the coefficient of the public ownership variable is nega-
tive and significant, pointing to a lower intercept for SIEs. This suggests
that when looking at countries with lower institutional quality, SIEs
innovate less compared to private companies. Conversely, the coeffi-
cients of the interaction between public ownership and institutional
quality measures is found to be positive and significant. An increase in
the level of institutional quality at the country-level contributed to
patenting performance more for SIEs than for private companies. This
result is consistent with our conceptual framework and we interpret it
in the light of the double relation (internal and external) connecting the
quality of institutions to SIEs. Under an improved institutional en-
vironment, both SIEs and private firms benefit from being located in a
safer place where they can develop their business, but only SIEs seem to
take advantage of an improved internal governance and organisational
model for patenting purposes. Only in a high institutional setting are
SIEs less prone to political capture, more likely to be managed effi-
ciently, and committed to long term stringent social goals, resulting in a
higher patenting performance. These results show that a firm's attitude
towards patenting crucially depends both on its internal institutions,
which are ultimately affected by ownership identity, and on the quality
of the institutional environment where the firms operate.
In Table 3 we confirmed that our results are valid when other five
different WGI measures of institutional quality are considered. Results
show that, irrespectively from the chosen indicator, the quality of in-
stitutions is always positively associated with firm patenting activity,
with a differential impact across SIEs and private enterprises.17
6. Robustness checks
6.1. Endogeneity
Our results show that the firms’ patenting behaviour is positively
associated with public ownership. However, this result would be biased
if the ownership structure was endogenous with respect to the firm's
patenting activity: it may be the case that differences across firms in
their patenting activity influenced the decision to privatise before 2007.
For example, state-owned companies characterised by a bad perfor-
mance may have been converted into private firms more likely. If this is
the case, governments would have continued to keep into their hands
the best performing enterprises and the results from our estimates
would have been the output of this different behaviour. Indeed, the
evidence we provide for the period 2007–15 that public ownership is
positively correlated with the patenting behaviour would depend on the
fact that, in the past, less innovative SOEs were privatised, thus af-
fecting negatively the patenting performance of the firms that, in our
considered period, are identified as private.
To address this potential endogeneity issue, we provide three dif-
ferent sets of arguments. First of all, we claim that our period of analysis
is not subject to relevant changes in the privatisation of the chosen
companies. In fact, our analysis is carried out for the period 2007–15,
when the ownership structure of the firms under consideration remains
quite stable. This would partially rule out the possibility that the
ownership of the firm changed during the considered period because of
their patenting activity and thus inducing an endogeneity problem in
our estimates. A second argument, more qualitative in nature, comes
from our analysis of the existing literature. We find ample support for
the argument that the best performing SOEs were privatised more often
than the worst performing ones. This has been often referred in the
popular press as the “selling off the family silver” argument.18 For ex-
ample, Obinger et al., 2016 show that, when partisan political groups
are involved into the decision to privatise, one of the most frequent
rationales is the need by government to soften budgetary constraints via
revenues deriving from privatisation. Following this, SOEs with higher
market value potential are found to be privatised first, while the di-
vestiture of loss-making companies has been often delayed until a
complete financial restructuring was done (so that financial investors
could find them more attractive). Similarly, Megginson and
Netter (2001) and Florio, 2004 claim that the divestiture of British
Telecom in the UK was the ‘mother of all privatisations’ because it was
extremely attractive to investors. When looking at the non- European
context, Ure, 2003 discusses telecom privatizations in Asia. The authors
highlight a long list of determinants of privatisation decision, all with
fund raising or cost cutting purposes, without a clear implicit correla-
tion between the timing of privatization and company performance.
Overall, the literature does not support the view that less per-
forming firms are more likely to be privatised compared to best per-
forming ones. As it is widely acknowledged the important role of
technological innovation to economic performance (Griliches, 2007;
Freeman and Soete, 1997; Archibugi and Michie, 1998), we expect the
performance of a company in a technological industry such as tele-
communications to be correlated with the level of patenting. Following
this, we most likely expect the decision to privatise a SOE either to be
not correlated with its patenting activity (the decision to privatise is not
related to economic performance/patenting) or to be positively corre-
lated (it is the best performing/innovative companies that are priva-
tised following the “selling off the family silver” argument). In the first
case (no correlation) our estimates would be unbiased, while in the
second case (positive correlation) our estimates would be downwardly
biased. In any case, on the basis of the evidence provided by the existing
literature, we feel confident to reject a problem of endogeneity which
points in the direction of an upwardly bias of our estimates. This would
mean the existence of a negative correlation between the decision to
privatise SOEs and the level of patenting of the company (i.e. it is the
worst performing companies which are more likely to be privatised), an
association which finds no support in the vast literature on privatisation
in developed and developing countries.
Our third step in the analysis of a potential problem of endogeneity,
rests on a quantitative robustness check of our results. As the potential
bias depends on the fact that some public assets were transferred into
17We have also checked the robustness of our results to the use of other
institutional quality indicators: regulatory quality indicators which are specific
to the telecom industry. Notably, we introduce alternative indicators from the
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Regulatory Tracker de-
veloped by the UN agency International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
(Faccio and Zingales, 2017; Castelnovo et al., 2019). Our main results are
confirmed and provided in Tables A5 and A6 of the supplementary material.
18 During a famous public speech to the Tory Reform Group on Margaret
Thatcher's Privatization policies, the former UK prime Minister Harold
Macmillan referred to the privatization process as a decision to sell off the fa-
mily silver (“Stockton attacks Thatcher policies”, The Times, 9 November 1985, p.
1)
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private hands in the past, we re-run our main regressions by excluding
from the sample those firms that have been privatized in the years
preceding our period of reference. In this way, we exclude the possi-
bility that our results are driven by the historical decision to privatize
depending on the firms’ performance.19 We identify 149 firms be-
longing to our sample which have been privatised over the period
1980–2007, totalling 1014 firm-year observations, which have been
promptly excluded from our sample for the purpose of our robustness
check. We re-run our main regressions on this smaller sample com-
prising 3844 firm-year observations. We report the results in Table 4.
Results confirm our main findings and hence provide further support
for the robustness of our estimates to the endogenous ownership shift
depending on firms’ patenting activity. By removing private companies
which are the result of a privatisation process, in these estimates we
compare state-invested enterprises only to private firms which have not
undergone any privatization process. Interestingly, the SIE coefficient
(Column 1, Table 4) is 1.3 points higher than the one estimated using
the whole sample (Column 2, Table 2). This change seems to be
coherent with the “selling off the family silver” argument and suggests
that, at most, our previous results were biased downwards, as the in-
clusion among the private firms of the best performing privatised SIEs
could bring to an underestimation of the correlation between public
Table 3
Alternative institutional indicators.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
SIE −11.176⁎⁎⁎ −16.183⁎⁎⁎ −5.975* −5.397⁎⁎ −1.722*
(2.189) (2.577) (3.072) (2.201) (1.009)




















Constant −5.755⁎⁎ −5.543⁎⁎ −13.996⁎⁎⁎ −8.768⁎⁎⁎ −9.321⁎⁎⁎
(2.836) (2.388) (2.835) (2.336) (2.030)
Observations 4854 4854 4854 4854 4854
Year and Country FEs YES YES YES YES YES
Pseudo R-sq 0.882 0.883 0.885 0.887 0.871
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎ p< 0.1; Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. The following explanatory variables are included in the regressions although their coefficients have
not been reported for space reasons: operating revenues; tangible and intangible assets; age of the firm; whether it is listed and concentration ratio. The sign of their
coefficient is consistent with the results presented in Table 2.
Table 4
Robustness check with no privatised firms.
(1) (2) (3)
Tangible Assets −0.146⁎⁎⁎ −0.193⁎⁎⁎ −0.211⁎⁎⁎
(0.056) (0.052) (0.053)
Intangible Assets −0.064 0.057 0.072
(0.082) (0.080) (0.078)
Operating Revenues 0.520⁎⁎⁎ 0.548⁎⁎⁎ 0.556⁎⁎⁎
(0.114) (0.123) (0.123)
Age 0.862⁎⁎⁎ 0.895⁎⁎⁎ 0.882⁎⁎⁎
(0.171) (0.195) (0.193)
Listed 4.018⁎⁎⁎ 3.806⁎⁎⁎ 3.947⁎⁎⁎
(0.338) (0.296) (0.299)
Concentratio Ratio −6.479⁎⁎⁎ −2.770⁎⁎ −2.691⁎⁎
(0.818) (1.081) (1.069)
SIE 3.047⁎⁎⁎ 2.801⁎⁎⁎ −11.986⁎⁎
(0.367) (0.374) (4.981)




Constant −6.688⁎⁎⁎ −20.589⁎⁎⁎ −6.996
(2.198) (3.988) (5.156)
Observations 3840 3840 3840
Year and Country FEs YES YES YES
Pseudo R-sq 0.908 0.924 0.927
⁎⁎⁎ p < 0.01.
⁎⁎ p < 0.05.
⁎ p < 0.1; Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
19 To run this robustness check, we had first to identify the telecom en-
terprises belonging to our sample that have been privatised in the period 1980-
2007, as before this period no relevant privatisations took place in the tele-
communication sector (Koske et al., 2015). We retrieve this information from
three different data sources. First, we rely on the Bureau Van Dijk's Zephyr
dataset, which reports worldwide information on completed deals (i.e. IPOs or
acquisitions). We identify all the telecom enterprises from our sample which
have been targeted in a M&A in the period 1980–2007 and, because of that,
have changed their ownership status from public to private. We merge this
information with data from the Privatization Barometer, an internet portal
launched in 2003 and recently acquired and managed by KPMG, which reports
detailed information on the privatisations which took place in the OECD area
over the period 1980–2007. Finally, we cross-checked the reliability of the
collected data with information from the Wikipedia list of privatisation by
country
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ownership and patenting activity.20
6.2. Other robustness checks and supplementary analyses
As a further check, we verified the robustness of our results to
several alternative specifications. For ease of exposition, the results are
shown by the last specification of the model where the type of public
control is specified and interacted with the Control of Corruption in-
stitutional variable although the results are broadly confirmed when
adopting other institutional quality indicators.21
The first set of robustness checks pertains to the nature of the de-
pendent variable. Although the Poisson regression has demonstrated to
be a specification that is quite robust to the excess of zeroes (as well as
over-dispersion and departure from Poisson distribution - see Bertanha
and Moser, 2016), we carried out an additional control for potential
problems arising from a disproportionate number of zeros in our de-
pendent variable (out of 707 companies, 595 have never applied for a
patent in the considered period. The percentage of zero patenting in-
creases up to 90% when considering firm-yearly observations). To this
purpose, we ran our set of estimates, adopting both Zero-Inflated
Poisson and Hurdle specifications (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). While
the former permits the decision to not patent in a mixture of Poisson
and logit models, the latter keeps the decision to patent separated from
the process generating the positive outcomes. Table A1 of the online
supplementary material presents results for the two models, both of
which confirm our main findings.
Second, in light of the low within variation of our main explanatory
variable, we considered whether unobserved heterogeneity represents
an issue in our estimates. We adopted a pre-sample mean estimator
(Blundell et al., 2002) in which the inclusion of the firm's pre-sample
mean of patent applications among the explanatory variables proxies
for the unobserved difference among firms in their ability to patent and
allows us to control for possibly correlated, time-invariant hetero-
geneity. Table A2 of the online supplementary material shows a positive
and significant effect of patent pre-sample mean. More importantly,
even after capturing the firm-specific effect through the pre-sample
mean, our main results are confirmed. Improvements in institutional
quality increase the patenting performance of SIEs at a faster pace
compared to private firms.
Third, we evaluated whether our results are robust when the quality
of patent applications, and not only the simple count of patent appli-
cations, is taken into consideration. To do so, we resorted to a con-
solidated literature that developed a number of indicators to proxy for
the quality of patents companies apply for (Squicciarini et al., 2013;
Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004). For the purpose of our robustness
check, we relied on three main indicators: the number of granted pa-
tents and the number of patent applications weighted by the number of
citations received in forward 3- and 5- year windows. The results re-
ported in Table A3 of the online supplementary material support our
main results.
We also considered whether our results are driven by some relevant
outliers (e.g. firms with a particularly intensive patenting activity)
given the long fat tails in the distribution of patent applications.22
Therefore, we tested the robustness of our results by trimming the right
tail of the patent distribution. Table A4 of the online supplementary
material shows that our results are also confirmed when yearly
observations with more than 500 patent applications are excluded from
our sample, leading us to 4810 firm-year observations.23
Finally, we tested the robustness of our results to alternative defi-
nitions of public ownership. In our work, a firm is classified under
public control when its ultimate owner is a public body. Given this
broad definition, the SIE cluster encompasses enterprises with different
intensity of government control, measured by the number of shares
owned by the government. This heterogeneity might somehow affect
our results, sine the capacity of the government to effectively control
the SIE and to influence its strategies might depend on the number of
shares owned by the government.24 To explore this issue, we replace
the SIE dummy variable with the percentage of shares owned by a
public body, which equals zero in the case of private enterprises and we
investigate whether the patenting activity is correlated with the per-
centage of shares owned by the SIEs’ top shareholder. Results reported
in Table A7 of the online supplementary material are consistent with
our previous findings. We further explore this issue and check whether
the relation between patenting activity and public ownership is linear
in the percentage of public shares. For this purpose, rather than using a
continuous variable, we create a categorical variable (please refer to
Section 1.2.2 of the online supplementary material). Results are re-
ported in Table A8 of the online supplementary material. Interestingly,
we find that patent applications increase with public control when
public ownership is mixed and open to private equity. Consistently with
previous findings, this seems to suggest that it is the mixed ownership
with partnership among private and public investors, rather public
ownership per se, the crucial ingredient that explains the increase in
patenting activity (Brander et al., 2015; Bertoni and Tykvová, 2015).
7. Conclusions
This paper contributes to the current debate on the role of govern-
ments in supporting innovation by taking a novel research avenue. A wide
and well-established macroeconomic literature points respectively to the
role of innovation and of institutions as facilitators of growth. We extend
this literature by combining these intuitions in a firm-level frame of ana-
lysis. By considering patents as an empirical, albeit imperfect, proxy of
knowledge creation by firms, our findings confirm that the quality of
government is indeed correlated with the patenting performance of major
telecommunication companies worldwide. This is per se an interesting
result because the telecommunication industry has been pivotal in chan-
ging modern economies through the transition from analogue telephony to
digital information and the internet economy.
Ownership of firms is per se an institutional arrangement, and the
quality of firms’ governance should be correlated to their performance,
including their patenting performance. Previous literature largely sup-
ported the full privatisation of state-owned enterprises by pointing to
the low quality of their governance. The divestiture of British Telecom
by the Thatcher government more than thirty years ago has been de-
fined ‘the mother of all privatizations’ (Megginson and Netter, 2001).
However, governments around the world are still the ultimate owners
or top shareholders of major telecom companies. We find that the pa-
tenting performance of SIEs, while often inferior to that of their private
counterparts, is strongly affected by the quality of government. We
interpret this result in accordance to Borghi et al. (2016) who suggest
20 These findings are confirmed when we employ alternative institutional
quality variables. Results are available from the authors upon request.
21 Results are available from the authors upon request.
22 The Skewness/Kurtosis tests for normality reject the hypothesis that the
patent-counting variable is normally distributed. While both values depart from
those typical of a normal distribution, Kurtosis is much larger (around 500,
compared to a value of 3), thus supporting the presence of fat tails in the patent
distribution.
23 Given the widespread geographical distribution of the enterprises and the
resulting low number of observations that are obtained once country institu-
tional variables are introduced, we wanted to exclude the possibility of our
results being driven by few enterprises located in specific countries. To address
this issue, we also ran our main specification: (i) with institutional quality in-
dicators aggregated in quintiles; and (ii) by replacing them with a binary
variable that allows enterprises located in the top 25 institutional countries to
be distinguished from the others. The results are consistent with previous
findings and available upon request.
24 We thank two anonymous reviewers for pointing this out.
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that while any firm may enjoy the benefits of good government in terms
of a favourable external environment, there is an additional specific
effect for SIEs. They directly benefit from quality of government in
terms of being subjected to less political interference in the appoint-
ment of managers and of transparency of the public mission that is
assigned to them.
For the first time in the literature, we empirically study to what
extent public control of SIEs can reverse the traditional negative per-
ception of SIEs in terms of patenting when the government is of high
quality. In fact, we find that when the government of a country with
good institutions (low corruption, high government effectiveness, high
rule of law, good regulatory quality, good voice and accountability,
high political stability) controls a major telecommunication company,
this company is able to benefit more from knowledge creation than its
private counterpart.
This novel and striking finding, which goes against a mainstream
tenet about the low performance of SIEs, suggests that government
ownership may act as a ‘patient investor’ mechanism against the short-
termism of private ownership. This result matches very well with a
recent stream of empirical literature that has found decreasing R&D
expenditures in privatised firms. In fact, we find that there is no dif-
ference in the patenting activity of private and partially privatised
telecommunication companies.
Our results are confirmed when we exclude the privatised firms
from the analysed sample. We adopt this strategy to mitigate the risk of
our results being biased by a problem of ownership endogeneity. We
acknowledge that there may still be some source of endogeneity that we
cannot control for with the available data. Future research should
consider as a separate topic the drivers of ownership changes, possibly
extending the data back in time to when the worldwide tele-
communication industry experienced ownership changes (see for ex-
ample Millward, 2005, 2011, Finger and Kunneker, 2011).
We do not wish to draw any strong policy implications from our
results. We are not claiming that SIEs are always more innovative than
their private counterparts, as in fact we find the opposite to be true
when considering countries with poor institutional quality. Our find-
ings underline that improvements in institutions and in SIEs’ internal
governance (see e.g. OECD, 2015) can be an alternative to (full) pri-
vatisation in enhancing dynamic efficiency within a firm, particularly
when divestiture of government ownership is not desirable. These
reasons may include adverse stock market conditions, security con-
cerns, and an advantage for the government to earn a dividend instead
of corporate taxation when there is fiscal competition among jurisdic-
tions. Overall, future research should explore this question: to what
extent could a mission-oriented innovation policy in countries with
high quality of institutions include reformed public enterprises in its
scope? To what extent an innovation public mission for (partially) state-
owned enterprise can be considered as an alternative or a complement
to subsidies or other incentives to the R&D of private or fully privatized
firms? These questions are even more important now, given the in-
creasing evidence on the decline of R&D in some privatised network
industries (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2011).
In this perspective, the government's partial ownership of firms in
some industries may enable it to play the role of a patient investor,
which is known to be favourable to corporate innovativeness, and may
be a less costly approach than to offer R&D subsidies to private firms
(with unavoidable principal-agent issues). Further research is needed to
assess the cost and benefits of such a policy, particularly in network
industries of strategic importance such as telecommunications, energy,
and possibly transport.
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Appendix – Patent data in the telecommunication industry
Apart from the standard argument of data availability (patent data is publicly available in long time series and can be linked to existing firm level
datasets), patent data has the advantage of providing a good picture of firms’ technological trajectories both across time and space given the stability
of the requirements to obtain patents through time and across countries (Kleinknecht et al., 2002). More importantly, the use of patent count to
measure innovation would affect our estimates especially if the vertical integration strategy and the decision to outsource or to maintain internally a
R&D division changed significantly among private and public firms following the structural changes affecting the telecommunication industry since
the 1980s. We have to recognize that our analysis focuses on telecommunication companies providing wired (NACE 61.10), wireless (NACE 61.20),
satellite (NACE 61.30) and other (NACE 61.90) telecommunication activities, while companies providing communication equipment (manufacture
of computer, optical products, electronic components and boards, communication equipment or consumer electronics) are not included into our
sample. This implies that the patenting activity of the telecom companies composing our sample is not likely to embed the main technological
breakthrough that contributed to change radically the telecommunication sector, i.e. software and microprocessors were not developed by telecom
companies. If private telecom companies were to externalize R&D activity more than SOEs following the structural shifts happening in the industry
(technological breakthroughs, privatisations, change in corporate structure, etc.), the difference between private firms and SOEs in patenting per-
formance would be explained by this change rather than the arguments set forward in Section 2. Hereby, we put forward some arguments which
bring us to believe that risk of not comparing like with like is low. First, as argued by Davies (1996) and Nightingale et al. (2003), the major
breakthrough innovation which contributed to radically change the telecommunication sector took place since the 1960s and mainly before the
2007–15 period that we analyse. During this period, firms had a similar structure and most of the telecom companies purchased the major in-
novations developed by the communication equipment manufacturing sectors, independently on their ownership nature.
Second, we have investigated the technological content of the patents applied for by the companies in our sample to check whether the tech-
nological development of their patenting activity can reassure us that telecom firms are contributing with relevant innovation in the telecom domain.
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We have retrieved information on the patents filed by the telecommunication companies in our sample from PATSTAT. PATSTAT is a comprehensive
database containing patent-level information from a large number of patent offices worldwide. Notably, we collected information on the techno-
logical classes (according to the international patent classification - IPC) the patents were allocated to. As IPC technological classes are quite
technical and go to a deep level of disaggregation, we resorted on aggregations of these classes in higher level constructs provided by Schmoch, 2008
and available on PATSTAT. Fig. A1 shows the relative importance of different technological fields in different time periods. While before the 1990
most of the patents filed by telecommunication companies fell inside the ‘telecommunication’ technological field, after the 2000 the share of patents
in the ‘digital communication’ technological field gained prominence. This is very much in line with the technological development of innovation in
the telecommunication sector following breakthrough innovation in the digital domain (Davies, 1996; Nightingale et al., 2003). At the same time, as
reported by Schmoch, 2008, p. 8 of the annex) ‘digital communication’ is a self-contained technological field at the border between tele-
communications and computer technology. It seems that, following the digital revolution, telecommunication companies increasingly focused on
patenting technologies in an area combining both digital and telecommunication technologies and did not completely externalised the innovation
activity to equipment and component manufacturers. Thus, we trust that the above evidence provides further support for our argument that patents
are still a reliable proxy of the innovation activity carried out in the telecommunication sector and that patent data mimics well the changes which
happened in the sector through time.
Third, to understand whether our analysis might be affected by a different R&D outsourcing strategy among private and public enterprises, we
further analyse the trend of their patent activity, R&D expenditures and the cost of goods sold. If the decision to maintain internal R&D division or to
outsource it significantly changed among private and public companies, then this should result in a discontinuity in the trend of the input and output
of their innovative process. Notably, if the strategy to unbundle and outsource R&D activities prevailed among private companies compared to public
ones, then this should result in a discontinuous reduction in their amount of patents, in a reduction in their R&D expenses and in an increase in their
costs compared to the SIEs, as goods that were previously developed internally are now purchased in the market.25 Fig. A2 does not show any
significant discontinuity and bring us to prudentially reject the possibility that differences in the public and private patenting activity was driven by
significant difference in their outsourcing strategies.
Finally, we recall that in our empirical strategy we analyse unconsolidated data and we control for the firm specific economic sector (NACE four
digit). This allows us to partially account for potential differences among enterprises in their corporate structure.
Although the arguments reported above support the choice of our patent measure to proxy for innovation, we are unable to completely rule out
the possibility of a bias in our results or their partial misinterpretation. As mentioned at the beginning of this section, using patents to measure
innovation in an industry such as telecommunication which has been subject to a high degree of turbulence in the past decades (i.e. change in the
locus of innovation, reconfiguration of firms’ corporate structures, waves of liberalisations) may be problematic. For this reason, we invite the
readers to interpret our results with caution and to take into consideration the arguments put forward in this section.
Fig. A1. Distribution of patents by technological categories. Source: Own elaboration on PATSTAT data.
25 Unfortunately, data on R&D expenses, material costs and costs of goods sold are available to us only for the period 2007–15 and contain several missing
observations (observations are reduced to 1342 for R&D expenses, 1209 for the cost of goods sold and 2893 for material costs). On the contrary, patent data are
available for the longer period 1985–2015 and do not present missing observations.
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